Christian apologist Glenn Peoples & the Insufficiency of Evidence for the Resurrection

Intro:

Christian apologist Glenn Peoples has finally gotten around to part 2 of his series reviewing atheist historian Richard Carrier's online version of his case arguing that the apostle Paul and the early Christians probably believed in a super-physical resurrection where Jesus got a new and improved body and left his old one behind (and hence no empty tomb as legendarily portrayed in the gospels).  Specifically Peoples is evaluating Carrier's arguments for the general insufficiency of evidence for the resurrection.

Peoples says:

...Carrier is not here giving an argument against the resurrection of Jesus. He is only arguing that if Jesus physically rose from the dead and Christianity is true, God is “stingy” and doesn’t share his revelation with as many people as need it.

It is logically possible for there to be a resurrection of Jesus and for no one in particular to have to know about it.  However, Peoples needs to actually offer a good reason to expect the "morally perfect god" to be stingy in order to properly dislocate the ideas from each other.  Just because there are Christians all over the spectrum on that claim doesn't mean they have a good case for other lesser expectations.

Peoples says:

Carrier thinks that a written sign in the sky (e.g. on the moon) would count as enough to show all humanity that the Christian God exists. But of course, as soon as we introduce the medium of language, we have to say that the sign is not really universal after all. Aside from the fact that not everyone of Jesus’ time was literate, even if they had been, the question arises: Which language should that message have been presented in? And how could people read it if it was on the moon (which in many night skies would not be large enough to read).

It is surprising that James Hale, J. P. Holding, and Glenn Peoples all seem to so easily forget what kind of a god they are supposed to be dealing with especially in light of the proof of concept of the miracle of Pentecost (Acts 2:1-13) since such technicalities did not stand in the way.  It's called magic, people.

Peoples says:

Similar problems present themselves for Carrier’s bizarre example of miraculously indestructible Bibles [...]  It is difficult to believe, on reading this, that this is the supposedly sophisticated intellectual case of a PhD historian against Christianity.

Peoples apparently has no problem with many miraculous claims peppered throughout the Christian scriptures, but Carrier's suggestion of an indestructible Bible to show which books are actually from a god finally meets with skepticism?  lol

Peoples says:

...it would not be good enough for the sign to be accessible to Chinese people who lived centuries later... 

...it would consign all those non-Greek speaking people of the ancient world to damnation. 

...they would not get the message to people who lived prior to the writing of the New Testament, nor would they get the message to illiterate people.

Peoples seems to just be digging himself into a deeper hole with his responses.  Jesus clearly favors gospel knowledge over ignorance with the Great Commission (Matthew 28:16-20) and yet the Bible indicates that for some bizarre reason Adam and Eve were allowed to have kids who could subsequently be misinformed by their wayward parents.  Yahweh focused on just one nation of Israel in the ancient world while all the others went along their merry evil ways.  And then with the evangelical ignition of Christianity, despite its success as the world's largest religion, still has managed to miss significant portions of the population in the last 2,000 years.  Yahweh is supposedly head over heels for free will and yet apparently doesn't equally value those free will decisions being informed decisions even though we should expect him to.  Lots of excuses can and have been made and Christians are all over the place on the issue, but the hypothesis that Judeo-Christianity is just a successful religion is more probable on these terms than any of those lowered expectations and ad hoc excuses that can get quite elaborately unevidenced (like apologist William Lane Craig's soul shell game where evil souls are all born in ungospeled nations).

Peoples says:

...perhaps [Carrier] would have been open to the realisation that virtually any outlandish fictional scenario he could concoct where God puts on some amazing show for a huge audience would still be subject to someone raising their hand and saying “but what about those people? They would still miss out!”   

Yeah...how about that omnipresent Jesus showing up and talking to everyone.  That was hard.  Moving on...

Peoples says:

At most, the conclusion that Carrier could justify is that God doesn’t meet his standards of generosity. But a Christian like this would be justified in detecting an air of arrogance to this. For Carrier, he might say, is assuming to know not only what he would do if he had Carrier’s existing knowledge plus God’s power. He is presuming to know what he would do if he had God’s knowledge and God’s power, which is to effectively say that he currently possesses God’s knowledge.

Oh here we go...  As I said over on Peoples' blog:

Alas, the standard retort to this is, “why should god listen to you?” or “who do you think you are to know better than god?” etc. as though we are not in a position to have to judge reality as best we can based on what we think we know. In other words, Christians are taking to it from a defensive position [and expecting others to have] to prove something wrong, whereas skeptics are taking to it from the position of needing to make the best positive case for any worldview based on what we know. If metaphysical naturalists took the same dishonest route of Christians, we’d shut down the conversation with something like, “Who do you think *you* are to pretend like you know enough about reality to say it couldn’t have happened by chance?” There may be some truth to that, but if everyone gets to say that kind of thing, that’s gridlock and we’re stuck with agnosticism all around. Which isn’t, btw, Christianity.

See also my FAQ over at the Richard Carrier wiki for a more elaborate version of this answer.

Peoples says:

Of course claims of miracles in other contexts counts as evidence for those miracles, and evangelicals have no reason to say otherwise. How could it not count? Evidence is any consideration at all that makes an event more probable than it would otherwise have been. Therefore, testimony is evidence. It should be clear to anyone that testimony of miracles worked by Vespasian clearly count in favour of such miracles happening – they make them more likely than they would be if there were no testimony of the miracles. But saying that if we allow the possibility of miracles then we have to believe all such testimony is clearly unwarranted. It is akin to saying that if we believe in crime then we have to believe every allegation of crime.  It’s a strange line of argument for a historian to make.

Carrier probably means to say that if we have to believe in this bad evidence for the supernatural, then we have to believe in all bad evidence for the supernatural.  The bottom line is this:  I've never seen any miracles.  And the only human institution qualified to evaluate that type of claim beyond my personal ability to do so (since it's a big world) is the scientific establishment.  And despite the scientific establishment being over half religious and cognitively favorable to such claims, there's no consensus in favor of even a single one of that nature or even an ongoing split debate despite there being numerous opportunities for Bible validating claims to be tested (which have been investigated).  Also, there are obviously many confirmed reasons to expect that humans would generate belief artifacts from their poor command of the human experience.  So until I have what I like to call a Miles Bennett Dyson level experience, I'm going to go with anything ranging from "I don't know" to, "That's probably false."  Maybe miracles happen, but I don't have any good reason to think so.  And I'm in a horrible epistemic position to sort out what they would mean even if they do happen.

Peoples says:

...the naiveté of Carrier’s suggestion that we have to experience events of a certain type ourselves in order to ever be justified in believing that they have occurred is not a tenable stance to take. It is to effectively declare as a matter of principle that any claim that a truly unique event has occurred in history must be dismissed not only as false, but literally impossible.   

I think Peoples is overstating Carrier's case.  Our brains work on past experience and we are always comparing past experience to incoming information to deduce whether we think it is plausible and believable or not.  It is completely reasonable to take our objections seriously or we have literally no way of disbelieving anything we hear about.  It's obviously a fallible process, but guess what epistemology is hard.

Peoples says:

Caesar crossed the Rubicon and invaded Italy, but in spite of prolonged observation of the Rubicon in modern times, no Caesars have ever been observed doing such things.

That's weak.  People do cross rivers and wage wars, so that type of experience is commonplace.  Now if Caesar flew across the Rubicon and shot everyone with death lasers...that would be a horse of a different color, now wouldn't it?

Peoples says:

It’s not that I agree that Carrier has really answered his critics before they offer their criticisms, it’s that Carrier himself simply wheels out arguments (such as this one against miracles) that have been criticised – “already answered,” if you like – many times over in the literature since Hume’s argument was first published, and yet he does not seem interested in going back and reading the literature on the argument against miracles to address those criticisms.

I won't be defending that our experience of the uniformity of nature somehow proves that "violations" of it cannot occur.  Carrier does not make that case either, even though Peoples seems to assume Carrier does because his comments vaguely resemble Hume's.

Peoples says:

Of course! If dead people rose all the time as part of the ordinary, observed course of nature, then the fact that Jesus rose from the dead would not be miraculous or significant.

So if we had good evidence that miracles occur, that would mean Yahweh was doing it wrong!  Evidence = bad.  Seems legit.  lol

Peoples says:

Lastly, the absurdly prejudiced characterisation of the writers of the Gospels as – for want of better terms – ancient dummies so stupid that they just didn’t know that dead people stay dead – is characteristic of the worst type of historical ignorance coupled with arrogance. Whatever scientific knowledge the authors of the New Testament might have lacked, they certainly knew that dead people do not just get up and walk away! So the quality of the witnesses as ignorant or living in a “backwater” country is really not a factor here.

lol, I always have to chuckle at this when apologists complain about skeptical prejudice since the gospel of Mark (Mark 6:30-38; 6:51-52; 7:18; 8:1-4; 8:15-21; 9:10) actually does portray the disciples as just that stupid.  Actually arguably stupider than that.  They can't seem to figure out that Jesus can do magic tricks despite being in his presence and watching him doing them over and over again.  He continually chastises them for just how dull they are.  This doesn't really even make any sense from a skeptical perspective at face value since it is just really bizarre.  However Carrier's review of Dennis MacDonald's "The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark" does seem to give a good explanation of why this would be.  Regardless, if we take the gospels as basically true, we have to accept that the disciples were really stupid.  Additionally, see Carrier's "Kooks and Quacks of the Roman Empire: A Look into the World of the Gospels" for the historical perspective justifying skepticism of our sources (as opposed to literary opportunism of Mark).

Peoples says:

But does the Gospel of John depict Thomas as rational and wise for refusing to believe until he had made direct observation? Not at all. Recall that when Jesus has shown himself alive again to Thomas, he chides him in John 20:29- “Do you believe because you see me? How happy are those who believe without seeing me!” It is strange then, to see Carrier preface this comment with “above all.” 

What's strange is seeing Peoples think he is improving his case by appealing to the fact his source-books reprimand interest in evidence and instead favor credulity!

Peoples says:

The Jewish community, its diversity notwithstanding, did not teach that the Messiah would die for our sins and then be resurrected. The Jewish hope was that the Messiah would claim David’s throne and wield political power, making Israel great.  [...]  Not only do we know that first century Jews were strongly opposed to religious syncretism, then, we also know that even if they had been so inclined, there just aren’t good candidates in the pool of myth and legend that would readily have been morphed into a Jewish Messiah who was crucified, died, was buried and resurrected three days later.

In another place, Carrier says:

Religious syncretism is the process of combining ideas from several sources, often the most popular or useful ideas in the air, into a new whole, making for a new religion. All religions are produced this way. Christianity therefore certainly was as well (it would go against all prior probability to claim otherwise, and against all the evidence as well). Judaism had a prominent component of sacrifices atoning for a nation’s entire sins, a belief in the holy spirit making Jewish kings into the sons of god (see Not the Impossible Faith, chapter 9), and a tendency toward ascetic denigration of sexuality. Paganism had a prominent component of dying-and-rising savior gods, who likewise offered ways to cleanse their followers of sins and thus procure them entry into paradise–not necessarily by their death, but always in some way, and in many cases through baptismal rituals long predating Christianity’s adoption of the same or similar ritual (see The Empty Tomb, p. 215, n. 210); and pagans had many traditions about virgin born sons of god. Note what happens when you combine the Jewish side with the pagan: you get Christianity. This is actually almost certainly what happened, and thus should not even be in dispute.

And as Carrier describes in his first debate with Mike Licona, it may have been just the right innovation contrary to what everyone else was doing that allowed Christianity to succeed.  Other Jewish sects expected some military force that would never happen, and Christianity somehow invented a heavenly temple and a new sacrificial system that the Romans could not touch.  So having an unfalsifiable alternative that satisfied similar spiritual yearnings of the time would make perfect sense.  

Peoples says:

Now, it’s true that after the resurrection of Jesus, Paul declared that Jesus had risen from the dead “according to the Scriptures.” 

Ah ha!  And yet this forces Peoples to belittle the connection:

What Scriptures did Paul have in mind. The reality is that there is precious little in the Old Testament to suggest any such thing. 

...go back into the Old Testament with this conviction and find allusions and parallels to the resurrection of Jesus there. 

The question is not whether or not people with knowledge of Jesus’ death and resurrection could, in principle, find references in the Hebrew Scripture that they could attach to the resurrection of Jesus. 

There is not a single Jewish source in the first century world to suggest any such reading of the Scripture.

And with that Peoples seems to be saying that the whole Jesus as Messiah and Old Testament prophecy thing is a huge retconning/tea-leaf-reading sham.  Good job.

Peoples says:

The view that the disciples literally invented the resurrection of Jesus out of nothing and then went around proclaiming him as risen – knowing full well that this was a lie – and ultimately being willing to suffer and die for this deception, has virtually nothing to commend itself.

You'll have to show me where Carrier argues that.

However, it is a little narrow-minded to think there aren't religious people who fervently believe in their core doctrines and yet find no problem selling the general public a more elaborate tale that they think helps promote their basic spiritual values.  And these people might also be willing to be martyred for it aside from the pious fraud they thought was perfectly justified.  The fallacy of the modern Christian apologist is to assume that the apparently lesser, more modest beliefs (whatever those may have been) were not just as valid to them as the more elaborate beliefs they passed on to later Christians.  There have been all sorts of religious people throughout the ages and we can't necessarily be sure what type we are dealing with based on their propaganda thousands of years in hindsight.

Outro:

Carrier's entire argument (a good hundred pages) on this topic can be found in chapter 5 of the skeptical anthology "The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave."  Note, what he argues there is compatible with his new case in the forthcoming mythicist book, "On the Historicity of Jesus" as he explains here in the Spiritual Body FAQ.

J. P. Holding Defends an Incoherent Incarnation.

Intro:

This post covers part of Christian internet apologist J. P. Holding's response to atheist Richard Carrier's chapter 9 in the book "Not the Impossible Faith" which is a refutation of Holding's original online essays which are no longer online.  This post will be part of The Richard Carrier Project.

The issues of this post are:

• Is (J. P. Holding's version of ) the Christian doctrine of Jesus' incarnation coherent?
• Did Jesus claim to be Yahweh incarnate by identifying himself with the Jewish concept of Wisdom?

And the short answers are probably not on both counts.

In a previous blog entry I wrote this:

This brings up the issue of the coherency of Christian concepts of the doctrine of the Trinity.  An entity with a separate will and a separate knowledge base (Matthew 4:1-11; Luke 22:42; Luke 2:52; Matthew 24:36) is a different person.  Even if you choose to do the will of someone else, that doesn't make you them.  Even if they grant you superpowers and equal authority, that doesn't make you them either.  Being them is what makes you them.  What's the difference between the Holy Spirit influencing or informing Jesus at times and influencing other prophets?  I don't know.  I don't know what it means to say that Jesus is the same as Yahweh if all the components of not being that god are conceded to be as a separate human person.  It just sounds like a bunch of nonsense.

How does Holding deal with this?  He asserts:

Personhood is not incompatible with being an attribute of another person.

Um...yeah it is.  As long as it is admitted that Jesus and Yahweh are two persons, that's two different gods (Or rather, Yahweh is a god, and Jesus is just an honorary god since he clearly would have all human components and whatever divine ones must have been slapped on like what could be done to any human).  It simply doesn't mean anything to claim that Jesus and Yahweh are the same being when Jesus is clearly meant to have all the limitations and faculties of the human condition and an independent will.  The things that make each person their own person are the same things that make them two separate beings.

The closest thing I can think of to help a Christian position out here is the Borg from Star Trek and the problem there is that even if there is a hive mind with people who are attributes of that greater collective, those "people" are actually drones with no free will.  The character Jesus had the option of doing his own thing on more than one occasion in the gospels.  A hive mind of distinctive persons with their own will and knowledge bases is really incoherent gibberish.  It's just like normal people being on the internet.

In terms of other conceptual possibilities, a human brain couldn't even process an iota of Yahweh's infinitude of anything, and it would have nothing meaningful to contribute to it.    A facsimile of Yahweh's personality in human brain form would infinitely pale in comparison to the real thing ("I'll call him mini-Me!").  I'm sure some of the official Christian concepts rely on superstitious concepts of the mind/body problem that are not immediately evident.  The only way Jesus and Yahweh could be one being is if Jesus is just an empty avatar body for Yahweh's will, like he's playing a video game.  Obviously that's also heretical for most mainstream Christianities.

Holding skips a whole section of Carrier's chapter because of Carrier's supposed ignorance on an important concept of Holding's that he addresses elsewhere.

Holding equates Jesus with the Jewish concept of "Wisdom" and says:

In Hebrew and Ancient Near Eastern thought, words were not merely sounds, or letters on a page; words were things that "had an independent existence and which actually did things."

So, apparently because of ancient superstitions about wisdom, all of the sudden this incarnation makes sense?  It's a common human mental bias to externalize things and treat it like a personal agent.  This sounds like a textbook case of that.  Hardly a sound foundation for a supernatural belief system.  [Note, Carrier actually responds to this Wisdom objection in his book on pages 249-250.]

The fact that ancient Jews accepted other semi-personified not-god god concepts doesn't make the concept coherent.  It just moves the incoherence back to that and explains that it had precedent (which supports a naturalistic account of Christianity).  The personification may have just been metaphorical.  In which case Jesus would be a new category of an actual personification of a divine trait.  It's hard to tell though with ancient sources, since it can be really hard to tell what they take seriously or what exactly their half-baked philosophy entails if they don't ever explicitly get into it.  And lots of philosophers in the history of philosophy say things they just don't mean.  Holding's reference to Philo's interpretation of Abraham's 3 divine visitors as an example of a Jew conceiving of a monotheistic trinity is again, just incoherent precedent.

So Holding dismisses some other ancient Christian ideas on Jesus' incarnation that actually make more sense (lol) and moves on to say this:

Christ's functional subordination (just as our words and speech are subordinate to ourselves) and his ontological equality (just as our words represent our authority and our essential nature) with the Father.

Our words may "represent" our authority and "essential nature," but that does not make our words either of those things.  That's like saying the word apple is an apple.

Holding casually glosses over the fact his references say Wisdom was created, since Jesus as a created being is a heretical view.  That's kind of funny.

Jesus' subtle appeals to Wisdom that Holding talks about seem to me to be like what any Jewish wise guy familiar with the traditions might say to themselves when they feel like people aren't listening to them.  Probably not a declaration of godhood.

Perhaps Holding could explain if Jesus is identifying with pre-Incarnate Wisdom how exactly he grows in knowledge and *wisdom* as a child (Luke 2:52)?

Also, since presumably Yahweh has more than just 2 attributes, by logical extension, Holding would have to accept the real possibility that he believes in much more than a trinity.  Also a heresy.  :D

The bottom line is that theologians are just going to have to shortstop logic all over the place and mystify this away since it doesn't really make sense.  The construction of the Nicene Creed seems to be more about Christian theologians (over time) backing themselves into corners because they don't like the implications of various views and merely swallowing what they found to be the most traditional elements of their religion even if those ideas differed from later versions they also sandwiched together.  Their view of their god is a happenstance historical Frankenstein concept glued together by implausible mystery and unsubstantiated authority.

Outro:

The last part of my response to the issues of chapter 9 will be, "J. P. Holding Defends a Special Incarnation" dealing with the likelihood of any first century Jews accepting the concept through the filter of how they understood what was possible in Judaism.

J. P. Holding defends an ignorant deity.

Intro:

Richard Carrier recently debated Christian apologist Douglas Jacoby over the divinity of Jesus and Carrier brought up Jesus' apparent ignorance of the benefits of washing one's hands.  Carrier used the point to show that Jesus was probably not god if he specifically denies that washing your hands has any important health benefits.  I happened to recall that the issue of Jesus' ignorance in general came up in the scuffle between Christian internet apologist J. P. Holding and Carrier in Carrier's book, "Not the Impossible Faith" in chapter 14 and so here it is.*

In chapter 14, Holding argues that Jesus' ignorance would have made him look bad and so this is supposed to strike of authenticity.  Holding appeals to the "criteria of embarrassment" touted by many scholars as an indicator of authentic Jesusness, but this appeals to what only seems like it should be embarrassing even if it isn't to that particular demographic of Christians in that particular cultural setting (and Carrier will get into a lot of detail in his forthcoming book, "Proving History" since the "criteria of embarrassment" has been popularly oversimplified and therefore misused).

As Carrier points out, Jesus isn't acting any different than the other gods in stories the common folk would be familiar with and so this probably wasn't embarrassing to them even if it should be.  How many TV and movie tropes make absolutely no sense, but we expect them to be that way anyway?  How much of our own culture is equally counter-intuitive and yet nonsensical sensibilities prevail anyway?  It's always amazing when Christian apologists seem to be insisting that no one ever accepts anything that doesn't make any sense, especially since as they should well know, sense-making is often in the eye of the beholder.

And so Carrier says:

[Holding] never proves [Jesus' ignorance] was a problem in the first hundred years of Christian preaching. Indeed, he doesn’t even establish that the statements in question were at all widely known even among Christians in the first century, much less an element of any conversion speech, even less an objection anyone raised until elite scholars took notice in the 2nd century.

Holding, with his usual level of internet maturity, says:

Playing the part of the spoiled playground child who dares you to jump over that building, Carrier complains of the lack of first century evidence for this being a problem, even as he admits that it was seen as a problem in the second century, as though ancient stupidity prevented this very obvious issue being raised 100 years earlier.

Maybe someone did raise the issue 100 years earlier and that's why they didn't convert.  How would we know unless we had evidence of it?  That's an important part of Carrier's point.

Further, if we are talking about particular ancient stupidity, even the Bible itself describes the disciples as some of the stupidest people on the planet (at least, according to Mark, where the disciples can't seem to figure out that Jesus can do magic tricks), so I don't think we need any skeptical prejudice in any event.

Aside from that, it makes sense that the average folk would have less problem (or no problem) with fallible deities and that the elite scholars (that we actually have on record) would.  Holding is the one who is supposed to be making the positive argument, but he's just making stuff up and Carrier is actually appealing to the evidence we do have.

However Holding exercises his all-powerful hairsplitting apologetic device:

Apparently Carrier cannot here distinguish between the pagan gods and the Jewish one. The issue here is that Jesus was ignorant in ways contrary to expectation for the deity he represented. In contrast, Zeus and the like were always depicted with human weaknesses and never failed to meet (much lower) expectations. The elite scholars critiqued the pagan gods for being unworthy -- not because they failed to meet an expectation according to their own described nature. [emphasis mine]

Holding presumes so much consistency like the earliest Christian target audiences were uber theology nerds.  Again, where is the evidence of such a strong expectation (and execution) of perfect ideological consistency?  In the long painful history of human beings just not thinking that hard about things (or just getting them wrong) and uncritically embracing traditional/cultural precedents and having blind spots, all of the sudden absolutely all of ancient Jewish culture turns on a dime and gets sufficiently picky for James Patrick Holding to have a point.  I'm sure. [/sarcasm]

So Holding has failed to make his point yet again.  But there's more.  Note what Carrier had said:

Those same elite scholars attacked all popular religions for exactly the same reasons: the precious myths the common people believed about their gods depicted those gods as exhibiting human weaknesses, including ignorance of things they should have known. Obviously, though this annoyed elite scholars, it was never any barrier to the success of widespread belief in these gods. So why should it have been a problem for Christians? [emphasis mine]

So...Holding wasn't really paying attention that hard apparently just like not every Jew is going to pay that much attention to theological consistency.

If we even had to go there this would require Carrier to provide some examples of elite scholars criticizing depictions of the pagan gods based on the appropriate god metric.  So I emailed Carrier and (after noting this wasn't even necessary) this is what he said:

...here are the examples of elite critique of divine ignorance, which exceeded the popular metrics for those gods (attacks on divine ignorance that *fit* the popular metrics are also available, e.g. the idea that one god should know how to sing and another not is *also* criticized as absurd, even though of course that is indeed what people believed, but Holding is, I presume, looking for a metric violation critique, and to that end...):

Lucretius argued that the gods don't even know we exist and wouldn't even know how to make people if they wanted to and therefore cannot have made us; they don't even know that lightning shatters and burns their own temples and statues (a claim of divine ignorance that was popularly denied).

This is the atomist critique of popular theology that is "denounced" in Plato, Laws 902a-b with the rhetorical question (which is supposed to be answered in the negative), "Shall we then assume, my worthy and excellent sir, that you assert that the gods are ignorant, and that it is through ignorance that they are neglectful when they ought to be showing care; or that they know indeed what is needful, yet act as the worst of men are said to do, who, though they know that other things are better to do than what they are doing, yet do them not, owing to their being somehow defeated by pleasures or pains?"

Lucian's Alexander the Quack Prophet attacks the god Glaucon for being ignorant by actually testing his oracle (James Randi style), where the god clearly couldn't divine the content of the submitted letter, and then noting how his oracles often go wrong (so clearly he couldn't predict the future). Yet he had countless avid believers (and continued to for centuries).

Lucian's Icaromenippus pokes fun at things like the fact that Zeus doesn't know what people on earth are saying about him (yet somehow knows there has been a decline in worship of him but plenty for the younger gods, a humorous contradiction, which *also* pokes fun at divine vanity). He even depicts Zeus using a kind of ancient telephone system (a series of special talking vats) to try and keep tabs on what's going on below. This was all funny precisely because popular conception held the gods to be ever present and aware of what people said about them, so the idea of them being confused about this and having to use magical machines to do it was an obvious joke.

Those are just the examples that come to mind. 

So Holding is just wrong again.  Oops.  No doubt Holding would make haste to delude us with more hair-splitting differences between these examples and the divine love of his life.

It's also a little weird that Holding doesn't tell us (anywhere I can find anyway) why Jesus' ignorance isn't a problem for Holding.  Otherwise we are left with the impression from this chapter that "It makes no sense, therefore it must be true!"

This brings up the issue of the coherency of Christian concepts of the doctrine of the Trinity.  An entity with a separate will and a separate knowledge base (Matthew 4:1-11; Luke 22:42; Luke 2:52; Matthew 24:36) is a different person.  Even if you choose to do the will of someone else, that doesn't make you them.  Even if they grant you superpowers and equal authority, that doesn't make you them either.  Being them is what makes you them.  What's the difference between the Holy Spirit influencing or informing Jesus at times and influencing other prophets?  I don't know.  I don't know what it means to say that Jesus is the same as Yahweh if all the components of not being that god are conceded to be as a separate human person.  It just sounds like a bunch of nonsense.

Does Jesus deny his own divinity?

Carrier makes a few references to Jesus apparently denying being a god to show that perhaps the early Christians conceived of Jesus' divinity differently than later Christians.  At this Holding says:

It is also obvious that Carrier did not thoroughly read Malina and Rohrbaugh, for had he done so, he would have known that Mark 10:18 is not in the least a "denial" of divinity by Jesus.  As their Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels (123) notes, in an agonistic (honor-shame) culture, a "compliment" like the rich young man's is actually a challenge and an attempt to put Jesus "on the spot" for they are an implicit accusation that one has been trying to rise above others. Jesus' only alternative was indeed to parry the compliment and redirect it to its appropriate subject (unless he wanted to reveal himself directly and fully, in which case, his claim would have been another challenge of honor to others!), thus showing himself honorable by diffusing any accusation that would arouse the envy of an opponent. Thus it is appropriate that Jesus parry the compliment in a way that does not specifically deny his membership in the Godhead (which, as noted, it does not). [emphasis mine]

I don't see Holding's argument.  He just asserts that some cultural convention is in play which doesn't seem to negate the element of it where Jesus denies he is the same as Yahweh.

Holding says:

Mark 13:32 contains no denial of being "God" at all and it is a mystery why Carrier thinks it does.

If Jesus is saying that Yahweh knows, but that he doesn't that implies he's not god.  This is not rocket science.

And so Holding continues:

If anything it is merely an example of the very problem my 14th point is stressing.

The point that Christianity gets to make no sense, but be true anyway?

Outro:

For the record, I agree with Holding that Carrier's points on omnipresence and Jesus as a suffering servant are not particularly compelling (but they're not needed).  Also, I agree with Carrier on Luke 8:43-48 that Jesus' "ignorant" question may just as well have been rhetorical.

I'll leave some of the other issues that came up in this back and forth for my own review of chapter 9.

***

*For those of you who don't know, most of the contents of Carrier's book were aimed at a collection of Holding's essays that are now only summarized in Holding's book, "The Impossible Faith."  I've been wanting to review the back and forth between them and post my final call on The Richard Carrier Project wiki.  Note, Holding's responses are no longer online.  Basically Holding makes a number of arguments in an attempt to show that since Christianity did all the wrong things culturally, yet succeeded anyway, it must have been because the evidence at the time showed that the religion was true.  Of course this amounts primarily (aside from a glaring argument from silence) to Holding gerrymandering all the cultural evidence as though Christianity were somehow always plunging headlong into the nexus of its fiercest opposition instead of playing the hand it was dealt to the elements of the culture that were obviously more receptive.  But you know, whatever.

Dr. Richard Carrier vs. Dr. Douglas Jacoby on the Divinity of Jesus

Intro:

This is one of Carrier's better debates. I think he did an excellent job. It was a long one though, clocking in at 3 hours, and there were over 23 questions asked from the audience by my count, mostly directed at Carrier. This debate is up there with his performances with Mike Licona and was interactive enough to tease out his views properly on the topic in relation to common Christian incredulity. It was also interesting listening to a Christian apologist gush all over the Jesus character in the NT while trying to maintain the pretenses of making an argument. On the other hand, it does seem that Carrier may want to work on his atheist "bedside manner," since most of his Christian audience seemed to spend most of their time being perpetually offended by their own continued misunderstandings of his positions.

The actual video should be available eventually, but here is the audio on youtube:

I think Carrier speaks well for himself for the most part, but I would like to throw my two cents in where some issues Jacoby brought up were left under-addressed and give some of my own commentary.  Be sure and check out the organizer of the event's review (Cameron English), "Debate review: Jacoby vs. Carrier" and also AIGBusted's review, "Re: Carrier-Jacoby Debate."

Jesus is so amazing, ZOMG!

• I had a project planned eons ago which was going to be a "Red Letters Commentary" on everything the Jesus character says in the gospels which would have been a great reference piece for this debate. Christians often enough profess to be amazed at Jesus' teachings and I wanted to have a series of posts I could point to that would show with thick doses of common sense that, "No, you've just been culturally primed to accept anything Jesus says regardless of actual merit." It would be a tantalizing opportunity to be able to read the words of an actual god incarnate, but I'm not about to pretend to be blown away if in fact I'm not. It takes too many excuses and arbitrary filters to make Jesus seem somewhat passable, and by that point you no longer have a positive case. Just a defensive one.
• There are many stupid or questionable things that Jesus says in the gospels. Just as one example, Jesus is accused of performing miracles by the power of Satan. Jesus asks rhetorically, "How can Satan drive out Satan?" It's called a ruse. Duh. If Satan wanted someone to buy evil teachings, he might have a fellow demon inhabit someone and then cast that demon friend out to "prove" that only not-Satan would teach these evil things. One would have to be completely oblivious to the con artists of the world to think what Jesus was saying is particularly clever (Carrier has similar things to say about this instance and Jesus as a not-so-great philosopher generally). Which leads us to...
• To perceive Jesus as sinless, one would have to beg the question on all the moral issues that he brings up. Advocating eternal punishments for finite crimes strikes many of us as pure evil. Telling people to hate their families, to cut off limbs and pluck out eyes, that lust is a thought crime, calling divorce and remarriage a sin, validating all the morality of the Old Testament, and advocating a number of other morally extreme teachings isn't exactly "blameless" in my book. It's rather demonic.
• As far as sinful actions and inactions go, Jesus condemns cities that he says would have repented if only he'd shown them magic tricks. He confronts people with information that they'll be judged more harshly for afterward, knowing they were going to reject it. He commands that all of his followers do similarly knowing that they will be making it worse for most people by telling them about a message that will condemn them given the overall trend will be to reject that message. Is this supposed to be all praiseworthy activity?
• Further, how in the world would we know Jesus wasn't thinking impure thoughts? How many historical figures' sins are actually necessarily recorded by history? How many religious figures are portrayed as more blameless than they actually were by their devoted followers? To see Jacoby ignore common sense and assert what is clearly just a reaction to doctrine and not the actual texts is baffling.
• As a challenge to Christian apologists who want us to believe there is something to Jesus' words beyond their own cognitive biases (or that skeptics are subject to their own anti-Jesus cognitive biases) I would propose that they fund a scientific study that would be a double blind sayings contest. Jesus' words would be removed from their Christian context and pit against many other sayings from many other philosophers and influential religious figures. Then you'd have lots of demographics of people rate how they feel about the passages to see who is really the most challenging, gracious, transforming, and really really remarkable of them all. If I'm not mistaken, something like this was done for the Koran, since it claims that its texts are extra special, but Muslims couldn't tell the passages apart from other passages. Muslims obviously inappropriately think the Koran is amazing, Mormons think the Book of Mormon is amazing, Taoists think the Tao Te Ching is amazing, and Evangelicals think the NT is amazing. As I've noted, I see many reasons to be unimpressed by the character Jesus in the gospels. If Evangelicals really want to sell us on something they want us to believe is something more than just a culturally primed arbitrary response to under-deserving texts (as is obvious in all these other cases), they'll need to do something like this scientific double blind sayings study to see if people are naturally impressed with Jesus on his actual merits. Otherwise, Jesus doesn't seem to have said anything any 1st century apocalyptic prophet couldn't have said on a good day.
• It is a bit curious that Jesus, according to Jacoby, is so infinite that he "can't be fit in a box" as well as so ignorant that we can't tell him from an ordinary human of the 1st century (who doesn't know local geography, cosmology, germ theory, or when exactly the end of the world will be). I'm still trying to figure out the "infinite" part of Jesus.
• If having some good comebacks that have been compiled after the fact by devoted writers is a good litmus test for divinity, I'm going to have to say that I'm now officially worshiping Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert (and ignoring that their writers had anything to do with it, of course).

Should we believe in the Bible with or without miracles?

• This is misdirection on Jacoby's part. The issue is that we live in a modern world where miracle claims are common and good evidence for them is not. In conjunction with that, people making stuff up, or believing things based on bad evidence is well evidenced. So the Bible should have miracles in addition to our modern world having miracles. For example, the Bible would be a lot more credible if only Christian evangelists could heal amputees in the modern world.

Jacoby argues the early church didn't feel free to make stuff up, because they had issues that the gospels didn't conveniently address.

• So...because it's not comprehensive they couldn't make up the painfully transparent polemics against unorthodox doctrines of the day? Might there not be other reasons why not every single issue isn't put into the mouth of Jesus? All it means is that they may not have felt completely at liberty to add whatever they wanted. It depends on the mechanisms of the broad category of "making stuff up." What if they were getting their content via dreams, visions, or feelings and subjectively it just so happened that not all issues were addressed through that filter? The psychology of mysticism is not necessarily an efficient process.
• Carrier, in email says: "We actually *don't know* what the big issues were in the latter half of the first century, and have only vague information about the early second century. It's also assuming a monolithic top-down church with a consistent agenda, when in fact it was hundreds of diverse communities and sects with different interests from each other, and the Gospels just represent four of those communities (just as other Gospels, e.g. Thomas, represent yet others; and for most, we have no Gospel at all to tell us what their concerns were). [...] the authors of the Gospels had specific goals they were trying to accomplish; they were not writing "church manuals" to address every issue whatever. They only cover the biggest and most common issues (e.g. dealing with intra-family tension, creating symbolic models for baptism, creating evidence of Jesus' divinity and resurrection), and in most cases are responding to each other rather than arguments outside the Gospels. Finally, no non-fundamentalist scholar agrees with Jacoby. They all concur that sayings are being fabricated (especially in John, to argue against and for specific issues John's authors deemed important; but also in Matthew, whom everyone recognizes is trying to write an anti-Mark, and his main goal is to support the Torah-observant Jewish Christianity, and has put words in Jesus' mouth to that effect; likewise Luke, who is inventing things to whitewash the conflict between Matthew and Mark). For example, Gregory Riley, Resurrection Reconsidered: Thomas and John in Controversy (1995) and David Sim, The Gospel of Matthew and Christian Judaism: The History and Social Setting of the Matthean Community (1998) and Boris Repschinski, The Controversy Stories in the Gospel of Matthew: Their Redaction, Form and Relevance for the Relationship between the Matthean Community and Formative Judaism (2000), and Richard Pervo, The Mystery of Acts (2008). Those show how real scholars treat the evidence, including the fact that each author had specific agendas, to which other issues took a backseat for them, being not their specific interest or important enough to them to squeeze in."

We learn from Jacoby that the ancient Jews were monolithic in their beliefs as well as diverse in a whatever-serves-Christian apologetics kind of way.

• Or rather, it seems Jacoby is exercising a "no true Jew" fallacy where all the good and faithful Jews would never entertain unethical pagan beliefs (though the discussion wasn't about ethics) and would never be influenced by pagan culture. We'll have to call these Super Jews, since no one in the history of cultural influences has ever managed to be completely uninfluenced by surrounding culture.
• Or, just as there are fights over who is the true "orthodox" Christians today where each of these groups perceives themselves as being true to their roots in the only proper way, there's no reason to think that the ancient Jews wouldn't have had their own version of those kinds of disputes. Jews are just as human as the rest of us and their perception of pagan religious concepts may not have been an "all or nothing" assault on Judaism. Or at least, not every single self-respecting orthodox Jew would see those concepts in the same light. They might reason any number of things. Since they wouldn't likely perceive paganism as a naturalistic phenomena, they could have pulled something valuable from whatever spiritual insights that complimented or elucidated their understanding of Judaism.
• Far too often it seems Christians have conditioned themselves to not be able think in hypothetical "normal" terms on this issue even though we are all aware of how mundane human behavior plays out.  The skeptics aren't saying anything extraordinary about human behavior that isn't necessarily guided by some Holy Spirit keeping a target group on ideological track.  In the long history of disagreeing with each other, people diverge from whatever you think that official group is without it necessarily having to do with their own sins.

Were the disciples immediately ready to make stuff up about the resurrection?

• Jacoby admits that legends can spring up quickly (like overnight), but he says that this doesn't apply to Christian origins since Jesus' disciples were completely demoralized by his death. However, this argument simply trusts the source material too much. It is as though someone later writing the story isn’t going to try to dramatically punch it for posterity. They'd exaggerate the highs as well as the lows to try to tell what they feel would be a more emotionally credible tale.
• And especially if the disciples were making stuff up in order to have a flashier story that appeals to the masses to propel a more modest divine moral message they still really did believe in, they would have just fabricated the part about them not expecting a resurrection as well. It is possible to alter more than one thing as it turns out. The history of religion is peppered with plenty of pious fraud, I'm sure.

Why didn't the appearances of Jesus merely confirm that Jesus was dead like visions of people who have been killed normally do?

• Um...maybe because Jesus' body was accidentally misplaced and so the tomb was found empty leaving a strong impression on superstitious minds that subconsciously wanted to find a way to repent of their cowardice and redeem themselves? Maybe because Jesus was delusional, really thought he was divine, and had already planted the suggestion that he was really going to rise? Honestly, that all visions are the same and have the same monolithic impact on every group of people ever is just stupid.

Is Carrier exercising "parallelomania?" to explain away the uniqueness of Jesus?

• This is the stock apologetic response to any application of “parallels” regardless of what is actually argued. "I’m subjectively not convinced, therefore you must be seeing parallels everywhere they aren’t.” "Meanwhile, pay no attention to all the ridiculously biased things I’ve said propping up Jesus." I get really tired of this accusation like just mining all the differences somehow negates all the obvious similarities. You have Christians explaining away all the parallels just as much as you have them implausibly accommodating them as though Yahweh meant to do that. It doesn't have to be precisely Star Wars or the Matrix to show the obvious impact on so many movies after each of them was made.

Carrier may need to work on his atheist "bedside manner."

• Carrier could profit from prepping his audience and padding his usage of the term "schizotypal." It was very clear from the reactions of Jacoby and the predominantly Christian audience throughout the debate that they all felt like Carrier was slandering them with something like "you are all crazy." Of course, that's not what Carrier ever said (and this actually reflects a form of ableism on the part of the Christians), he wasn't even referring to modern Christians, and he clarified more than sufficiently several times, but that didn't stop the many carred train of Christian offense. The fact is we all live in a world where there are actually schizotypal cults and inferring that an ancient religion may have been started by one (based on the kinds of things they say they were doing) is meant to be a description of reality. Not an insult.
• Also Carrier's very clinical response to the miracle claim of the boy who was dragged by a truck and torn up quite a bit and then was apparently okay a week later seemed to strike people in the audience and Jacoby as very cold and insensitive. Obviously Carrier was just being obvious and telling them how he'd investigate. It could have used some empathetic padding though.
• There also seems to be that collective Christian audience emotion that builds up in Carrier debates that could be diffused ahead of time that centers around anything Carrier says about his own salvation and willingness to believe on the kind of evidence he thinks is reasonable. It's quite humorous and predictable (and demonstrated by relief based cheers and applause when Carrier's opponent says something against it that they've been dying to hear), but it seems like perhaps he could find a way to pop that bubble ahead of time so that Christians aren't fixating on it while he's talking about other things.

What about Jacoby's accusation of Carrier's skeptical prejudice against the early Christian visions and revelations?

• If credulity is a virtue, then skepticism must be a prejudice, right? Rather than continuing to call Carrier "prejudiced" (3 times in the debate, I think), it would have been more appropriate for Jacoby to reiterate his own arguments that were meant to show that these visions were likely the real deal.
• I would have said this to Jacoby up front: The visions in the NT, from our epistemic vantage point, are indistinguishable from arbitrary hallucinations mistaken as the real thing that are ubiquitous in religion and humanity in general and I will be speaking as though this is a given, based on our modern understanding of what we know is possible, until sufficient evidence is presented that it was more than that. Carrier did indeed explain this, but he also kept using definitive language that the Christians were clearly fixating on as though his word use was supposed to be his argument rather than the actual argument he presented more than once.

Is Carrier a hypocrite for not diagnosing himself as delusional for having an encounter with a demon?

• This is the same ableism stuff as pointed out above as though you are a bad person for having a hallucination. This is about explanatory power, not insults! And "schizotypal" is not an insult!
• As I pointed out to Christian apologist J. P. Holding (and apologist Steve Hays made the same accusation of anti-supernatural bias in "This Joyful Eastertide"), in my post "Leaning Tower of Preterism" the Christian worldview does not tell you what is just a sleep paralysis hallucination and what is the real deal. As a Christian I was open to the demonic interpretation of my vicious sleep paralysis hallucinations that threw me around the room and crushed me in mid-air, and threw me back down into my bed. But I also knew it could just be a powerful dream (it's not like there were bruises when I woke up). Maybe Jacoby, Holding, and Hays have a secret decoder ring for that kind of thing, but Carrier and I do not. Even Jacoby admitted at one point that Christians can be at times a bit superstitious.

Jacoby says that Carrier's philosophy is too narrow-minded to come to the correct conclusions and that Christianity is about relationship, not science.

• The problem is that the relationship is also about truth claims that are difficult to appraise with the standards of evidence typical of believers of many different religions and sects and denominations in those religions. If I want to know that my special religious feelings actually mean what I think they mean, I have to be honest about everyone else's religious feelings as well and not exercise special pleading about my own. I'd need better evidence and that takes us into the world of all the sophisticated forms of argument and evidence that takes place between believers and other believers as well as non-believers. This isn't just to convince others since you'd necessarily need to know the answer to these questions yourself.
• Also, if I want to know that my prayers are being answered rather than me being deceived by coincidence, confirmation bias, and having a horrible statistics processing brain, I have to turn to something like the scientific studies which are aimed at greatly reducing those kinds of factors. For Christians to assert that they don't need that kind of rigor is to be intellectually irresponsible.
• I do agree though that humans shouldn't have to be masters of the epistemic universe in order to have reasonable beliefs about gods, however, it is very clear from the mass confusion of the religious world that such levels of rigor are required. When you have two or more mutually exclusive arbitrary explanations for something, you have to raise your standards and look for better evidence and argument to discern which is correct. The fact humans are put in this position actually argues against Christianity as it is quite an inhumane predicament for a shepherding god to put all of us in.

Q and A

Though these are numbered by the question, I may be commenting on any random thing said during that particular period.

Question 1:

Is Mr. Sermon-on-the-Mount really coming back for revenge on Judgment Day?

• Um...yes, this is the Jesus-is-a-nice-guy myth for Christians and atheists who have only read the Sermon on the Mount and neglected everything else the guy supposedly said. The turning the other cheek and forgiving your neighbor stuff is all good fun in this life, but Judgment day is supposed to be about catching up on all the justice that fell through the cracks. If sending the bad people to eternal suffering isn't revenge, I'd hate to see what Jesus thinks revenge would look like. Two eternities perhaps? Carrier had no reason to back down on his comments.

Question 2:

David Fitzgerald! Moving on...

Question 3: Does Jesus not know about germs when he says washing your hands doesn't matter?

• Jacoby insists that the context is a religious one and hence Jesus is just making a religious argument. However the fact that Jesus thinks there's only a religious issue at stake with washing hands is the very same problem. Even washing your hands with just water is better than doing nothing.
• Religious and disease related cleanliness laws seem to be freely conflated on any other occasion so the omission is a bit glaring.
• As my good friend Daniel Calvert once pointed out a long time ago, why doesn't the OT have the simple phrase, "Boil drinking water," randomly listed in Leviticus between stoning gay people and banning multi-fabrics? Sanitation is like a huge problem in the world today and always has been.
• Apologists will exploit any accidental religious prescription that seems to have some benefit as though this shows Yahweh knows things the Jews don't, but this episode clearly pops that bubble for that perspective in the very least.
• It's interesting that Jacoby seems perfectly okay with this being yet another example of Jesus' human limitations. Normally when Jesus is limited, one could argue that knowing the details of cosmology (like that the earth isn't flat) doesn't really impact anyone, but this example here is an instance where it actually does matter quite a bit.
• Also, this:

Question 5:

Near the end, Jacoby goes off on a "science can't prove science is valid" tangent as though science isn't ultimately based on human experience and as though that means that any old axiom is legit just because someone calls it an axiom. I covered a lot of these issues extensively in my review of chapter 2 and chapter 4 of "The Christian Delusion." I'm just glad Jacoby didn't derail the entire debate with them as is the custom of other apologists.

Question 7:

Jacoby wants to say there's not enough evidence to prove cultural diffusion is responsible for a lot of the Christian memes, though cultural diffusion is an ordinary claim about human ideas and requires minimal evidence which was actually provided. On the other hand, demonstrating that Jesus was god and had magic powers requires a great deal of evidence. Me thinks Jacoby is exercising dishonest epistemic scales.

Question 8:

Jacoby says that the spiritual world is real, that there is "true evil" in the world, and that demons are real. Maybe he could have like proved that or something to support his case that Jesus isn't just the god of Christian mythology?

Question 9:

Jacoby claims that apocalyptic literature (like Jesus' claim that angels would gather souls from all over the world for Judgement day before his current generation passes away and obviously nothing like this happened at the destruction of Jerusalem) shouldn't be taken any more literally than the stars falling from the sky should be taken literally. Of course, that begs the question of whether the authors of the Bible thought the stars were just little lights pasted up on the hard dome on top of a flat earth. See my series on the primitive cosmology of the Bible.

Question 12: lulz, I love it how this lady forgives Carrier for insulting her. Carrier should forgive her for her lack of comprehension.

Question 15: I'm pretty sure this woman said something about "Bees!" (in relation to accusations of hallucinations and 1970's acid trips).

And then she exercises the success fallacy as though she is completely oblivious to every other long term successful religious movement currently alive in the world. **facepalm**

Question 17: I disagree with Carrier’s answer to questioner 17 a little bit in that it would be feasible for a creator god to design us with the need for a divine relational purpose that we could approve of upon hearing it. Obviously our ability to assign meaning is independent of that in actuality. Lots of people are assigning meaning to their lives successfully in ways that mainstream Christianity would not consider divinely approved in a direct sense. So in reality there’s compatibility with hypothetical divine purpose, but it's obviously not a necessity.

Question 18: This is actually the same as question 5 on the criteria for sorting hallucination from genuine vision. Christians are so good at having convenient lapses of imagination when it comes to distinguishing good evidence of the supernatural from bad evidence of it. Compare the levels of evidence here between this clip of That Mitchell and Webb Look where the joke is that alternative medicine has been defined into reality every hilarious step of the way and this cancelled pilot of Ronald Moore’s 17th Precinct where real pagan magic has been incorporated into everyday life because it's obviously real. Get it? Got it? Good.

Question 20: I don't know what Bible Jacoby is reading when he says that compared to other obvious mythology the gospels are giving us "just the facts." To me the gospels read like 1st century Jewish comic books.

Question 21: We have our token atheist skeptic who rolls out some random Bible contradictions. Jacoby, amazingly, responds to each one without even as much disgust as I would have had. I could disagree with his answers, but they are a bit off topic.

Closing statements:

Carrier closes with basically Loftus' outsider test for faith that's an appeal to consistent standards of evidence, which is good.

Jacoby says several things, but I only want to comment on one of them.

• In order to justify such weak standards of evidence for establishing that his god is communicating to us all, Jacoby says that sometimes his wife gives him a subtle cue that he just has to figure out and that this is just the way relationships are. But what’s the number one principle of good relationships? Good, solid communication, right? It's not primarily carried on the back of secretive, hinty, mystical nonsense. The only reason the subtle stuff works in real life is because the overt stuff has been well established in those relationships. And if the overt stuff had been well established in the god relationship, we wouldn't even have Jacoby trying to justify what he thinks is the subtle stuff would we?

Outro:

So that's it. It was an interesting and long debate, with several laugh out loud moments for me at the Christian expense. I'm sure Carrier will perfect his game further for future engagements.

Ben

Comprehensive Defense of "The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails"

Intro:

This series is an atheist's review of an important anthology critical of Christian beliefs called, "The Christian Delusion: Why Faith Fails" (TCD), that is likely to be popularly discussed across the web. I'll be reviewing the book in light of just about every other response to TCD on the web (pros and cons) and responding to new Christian objections as I find them. I think this will be the best that I personally can contribute to advancing our collective conversation about these important roadblocks to solidarity in our culture.

The following is a "CliffsNotes" page of my review. TCD has 5 different sections, so I'll be breaking this up accordingly (although I've lumped in Dan Barker's Foreword and John Loftus' Introduction here). I've copied and collected all the contents pages from each post so there can be a meta-overview that is easily accessible. It will be easy for those interested to have an idea of the book's various failings and will also work well for me to skim through to find links to particular sections when I need to self-link in future posts.

If anyone knows the html coding for collapsing sections of a post, I'd love to apply it here.

Note, you can search the entirety of my review (which is already a book in length on its own, just by chapter 5) with this custom google search I've set up.

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Contents of this Contents Page:

Dan Barker's Foreword

Introduction, by John Loftus

Part 1: Why Faith Fails

Chapter 1, "The Cultures of Christianities," by David Eller (3 out of 5 stars)

Chapter 2, "Christian Belief through the Lens of Cognitive Science," by Valerie Tarico (5 out of 5 stars)

Chapter 3: "The Malleability of the Human Mind," by Jason Long (3 out of 5 stars)

Chapter 4, "The Outsider Test for Faith Revisited" by John Loftus (4 out of 5 stars)

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Dan Barker's Foreword:

I respond to John Loftus on Dan Barker's reputation: Is Dan Barker a dick?

Loftus believes I've insulted Barker with my original review. I point out why Barker deserves the criticism.

Barker tells instead of shows: Are atheists really that interested in the facts?

In a contentious context, no one listens when you tell them what to think. You have to show them why they should think it. Barker goes way overboard trying to tell us just how desperately interested in the facts the contributors of this book are.

There might yet be hope for the book: Is TCD intellectually challenging and respectful in tone?

Christian reviewer, James McGrath gives me some confidence that perhaps Christians won't be terribly offended by the contents of TCD. Although he's an overly tolerant guy.

Barker is careless with his praise: Does TCD defend the mythicist position?

Barker bothers to bring up mythicism (the idea that Jesus never existed as a historical person) in a book that does not defend mythicism. I demonstrate what a horrible misstep this is in terms of our Christian audience.

Random:

Richard Carrier seems mislabeled: Does going to a nominally liberal Christian church as a kid really count you as a "former Christian"?

Random humorous observation: Why didn't Barker's wife write TCD?

Random curiosity: Are the vast majority of churches in Europe empty?

Outro: Not rated.

Barker sets a fairly bad precedent that is unfortunately continued so far throughout TCD (I'm only on chapter 5 at this point) of "telling" instead of "showing." Ultimately that means an underlying tone of the book is "us vs. them" when we could have been all in the same boat reasoning together.

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Introduction, by John Loftus:

Loftus fails at diplomacy: Is the title, "The Christian Delusion" an ad hominem attack?

I would tolerate a sensational title if the authors took more responsibility for the internal presentation of the information and arguments. Unfortunately that didn't happen enough.

Loftus fails to frame his introduction to TCD: Are there no mainstream Christians?

Loftus attempts to shuffle mainstream Christianity out of the deck to make it look like skepticism has made much more headway than it actually has.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Paul Manata: Is TCD even long enough to refute the supposed thousands of Christian delusions?

Manata goes a bit too far in another direction.

I respond to Christian sensibilities: Has Christianity stood the test of time?

Presumably Loftus is attempting to counter the claim that Christianity always persists despite its most ardent critics, but that doesn't mean it does so because it is true.

Loftus is pretentious and cynical: Will TCD change Christian beliefs?

Loftus imagines that Christianity will mutate into yet another form because of the contents of TCD. No offense, and I hope the book has impact, but I doubt that'll be the case to a significant enough degree to warrant Loftus' claim.

Loftus fails to prove his point: How significant are the versions of Christianities that concede to various skeptical arguments?

Loftus could potentially save his point if he could show just how significant the demographics of arbitrarily rational Christian groups really are. He doesn't do this.

I respond to Christian sensibilities: Do atheists need new arguments?

Many of the old arguments still apply. Theists just think they got over them.

Random:

Understanding TCD: Do we need to read "Why I became an Atheist" before we read TCD?

Short answer: Loftus trips over his own words, but reading WIBA would help a bit more than Loftus lets on, unfortunately.

Loftus is unclear: Are Christian presuppositionalism and fideism new?

Loftus seems to think these ideas came about in his lifetime. Perhaps they were more developed in his lifetime?

I respond to Christian reviewer, Randal Rauser: Is Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga being irrational with his theistic properly basic beliefs?

Short answer: Yes. Plantinga is making an implausible exception when we compare theistic properly basic beliefs to the intimate checks and balances we place on other properly basic beliefs.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Cory Tucholski: Does Loftus misrepresent Craig and Plantinga's Holy Spirit defeater?

Short answer: Yes and no. Craig can be found to play both sides of the fence and there is no coherent way to represent his views.

Loftus' imagination fails: Should annihilationists fear hell?

Loftus demonstrates his failure of imagination since there is plenty of reason to fear non-existence if you have the chance to live in bliss for eternity. It would also be especially humiliating to be singled out on Judgment Day, and there be a brief period where you are burned up into non-existence in front of everyone else who is on their way to heaven.

Loftus fails to prove his case: Can modern exegetes get it right with so much historical fail?

Loftus tries to play different Christian exegetical conclusions against each other, but fails to give good examples.

Outro: Not rated.

The introduction amounts to sloppy, educated sh*t talk. Loftus wants to intimidate and overwhelm average Christian readers, but is probably going to cause himself more problems than it's worth.

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Chapter 1, "The Cultures of Christianities," by David Eller:

Eller's Overstates Argument: Is religion all culture?

I guide the readers over the journey to figure out what exactly Eller's argument even is. Then we realize his argument is outright fallacious.

Eller Asserts Conclusion: Are all religious arguments bogus?

Turns out, Eller declares premature victory over all Christian arguments and evidence with sentence twoof chapter one of TCD. Christians are not impressed.

Eller Misses the Mark: Should atheists be excusing themselves for failing to convert Christians?

Eller's chapter seems to be more about explaining to atheists why they fail to convince Christians with logic and evidence rather than about persuading Christians that they are delusional.

I respond to Eller's response to my review: Should "openly atheistic" books pass their own outsider test for faith?

Loftus emailed the original version of my review to Eller who clearly didn't get the point.

I respond to Loftus' response to my review: Are atheists obligated to agree with Eller's logic?

Loftus fails to tell the difference between disagreeing with fallacious arguments and disagreeing with conclusions.

I agree with Christian reviewer, Looney: Can there be a true religion after all?

Despite the hype for TCD, there is in fact a very obvious and typical "somewhere to run" for Christians.

The Point of Eller's Chapter: Should we be aware of the influence of culture in generating religious persuasion?

The tragedy of this chapter is that Eller didn't even need to include his fallacious reasoning.

Christian reviewer, Paul Manata makes a potential point: How much does culture affect the scientific community?

Probably not enough to matter, but it would be an interesting issue to explore.

Eller Overstates Point: Are the religious aspects of our culture a conspiracy?

Atheists accuse Christians of being deluded for seeing demons behind every bush, and perhaps the same should apply to anthropologists who see Jesus behind every sneeze.

Random:

I chastise the atheist movement: Should secular humanists be developing a well-rounded culture to satisfy human needs?

I use the arguments from Eller's chapter on the influence of enculturalization to show that atheists should be working on their own cultural paradigm. Eller might actually agree.

Eller abuses a common atheist metaphor: Would religious people be feeble without their "crutch"?

Eller says we shouldn't use the "religion is a crutch" metaphor, and I point out it doesn't have to be an insult. A wide range of "strong" and "weak" people are bound to be equally encultured by religion, so many people are simply unnecessarily letting religion rob them of things they could just as easily be doing themselves.

Eller is "one of those" philosophers: If years aren't real, does time even exist?

Obviously the idea that the delineation of time is arbitrary makes perfect sense, but after a painful chapter, one does not wish to see things stated so badly in "philosopherese."

Outro: 3 out of 5 stars

Important content for a book like this, but poorly presented. Bad start for the book.

---

Chapter 2, "Christian Belief through the Lens of Cognitive Science," by Valerie Tarico:

Tarico Vs. Eller:

I respond to Christian reviewer, Looney: Has Christianity converged on manipulative techniques or is it too plastic to even label a single entity?

Both the similarities and differences need to be explained and the orthodox Christian interpretation is not the best explanation.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Patrick Chan: So which is it, cognitive science or culture?

Both! And then some.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Paul Manata:

Is Christianity about right belief or isn't it?

If Christians were unified on what that one right belief was, there might be a contradiction between Eller and Tarico.

Why doesn't Tarico correct Eller about the effectiveness of logic on bias?

Manata quote mines Eller pretty hardcore to pull this "contradiction" off.

On Certainty:

I respond to Christian reviewer, jayman777: Can humans be trusted with metaphysical conclusions?

Jayman777 objects that Christians aren't supposed to be any more infallible than atheists, but Tarico's point is that humans can't really be trusted to evaluate far-reaching metaphysical claims.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Randal Rauser (and Christian reviewers, Steve Hays, Manata, Jason Engwer, and Dusman): Does Tarico defeat her own conclusions of certainty?

Um...only if you take her rhetoric to an incoherent extreme. But why would a charitable reader do that?

I respond to Hays:

Would Tarico's position make science impossible?

No, and she already explained why.

Does bias cut equally both ways for theists and atheists?

Potentially, but Tarico already conceded that.

Are subliminal biases uncorrectable if Tarico is right?

Given the ignored context of Tarico's quotes, not necessarily.

Psychology Vs. Religion:

I respond to Looney (and Rauser): Has psychology explained religious experiences?

Looney says he's familiar with how this kind of psychology works and asks why he should care? I explain that though his interpretation is possible, naturalism is a sufficient explanation and in any event there are many Christians who should probably at least be informed about what is attributable to psychology even if God may still be responsible in some way or some circumstances.

I respond to Hays:

Do Tarico's arguments only cover belief in anything at all for any reason?

It seems Hays didn't read carefully, and even a fellow Christian contributor to The Infidel Delusion (TID) knows better.

Does invoking cognitive science explain away the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus?

No. Tarico never implied it did. See Richard Carrier's chapter.

I respond to Chan: Does Tarico commit the genetic fallacy to explain away religious experiences?

Um, no. And even Manata admits this elsewhere in TID.

I respond to Manata:

But how does Tarico explain my boring church experience?

Tarico never claimed every congregation does things the same way. Manata doesn't get into how he actually converted and maybe he should.

Why did Tarico just repeat herself in her response to TID?

Um, given how much the authors of TID and other Christian reviewers didn't pay close attention the first time around, wasting their review on obnoxious misrepresentations and red herrings, they really don't have the right to complain.

Skeptical Denialism:

I respond to jayman777 (and Looney): Did Tarico only focus on the "born again" experience?

For some reason two reviewers here seemed to think Tarico was only explaining one aspect of religious psychology. While she never claimed to be covering everything, there were several other factors covered in the chapter.

I respond to jayman777: Are skeptics in denial of religious experiences?

Jayman777 complains that skeptics tread dangerously close to being in denial that Christians have any religious experiences at all. I sympathize, but ultimately this is about interpretation of actual experiences and arguments to the better explanation in context of a vast and arbitrary religious landscape (plus all of the anomalous non-religious experiences, too), rather than denial.

I respond to Rauser: But what if we see some really good evidence?

Then we'd have some really good evidence wouldn't we?

I respond to Engwer: But how can we be sure every miracle claim is false?

Why not show that one of them is true first?

Random:

I respond to Looney: Why didn't evolution favor a predominantly atheistic mentality?

I attempt to answer on Tarico's behalf (assuming evolution had much to do with religion at all) that atheism has no content and doesn't enable mental shortcuts for framing the human experience like theism tends to do.

I respond to jayman777:

Are abstract theologies a recent invention?

Short answer: Even if early Christianity had a more advanced understanding of their deity, that doesn't mean the OT authors did.

Does it make sense to pray to an omniscient being?

Short answer: It can. I explain that there are other issues, though.

Do all Christians base their faith on emotional states?

Short answer: No. But it seems that often even sophisticated theologians hinge their arguments on an underlying sense of existential and emotional entitlement.

I respond to Rauser: Is Tarico unreliable as a guide to the heart of Christian belief?

Rauser gets a little picky, but can he hold his point?

I respond to Engwer:

Do Tarico, Long, and Loftus misrepresent faith?

Maybe, but not nearly as much as Engwer misrepresents their statements.

Should Ed Babinski not be so confident of his conclusions in chapter 5?

Maybe, but Engwer needs to cite specific examples of where one author says something in the Bible is "too vague" and another says the very same thing is "too obvious."

Can skeptics explain away Paul's conversion?

Engwer complains that a hallucination doesn't account for all the evidence very well, but he ignores the lameness of the best evidence (Paul's own words) in favor of what isn't as credible on the same issue (Luke-Acts).

I respond to Chan (and Dusman):

What about Alvin Plantinga's argument against the reliability of naturalistic minds?

Most planets probably don't have life, most evolved organisms do not do a lot of thinking, we know most thinking organisms have faulty minds, and the idea that "maybe" none would if evolution is true is meaningless in the face of our direct experience with our own minds and the fact of evolution. And why wouldn't magic minds have perfect truth-finding abilities like we know we don't have?

What about the demarcation problem in science?

This red herring doesn't appear to apply to anything relevant here.

What about the problem of induction?

Christian philosophy does not have a solution to the problem of induction, so it doesn't make sense to complain when other worldviews don't either.

Couldn't God have made our minds in such a way they naturally conclude God exists?

"Maybe therefore probably" is fallacious.

Isn't Tarico and Dawkins' position on the popularity of religious thinking a conspiracy to avoid the truth of Romans 1:18-21?

Paul says EVERYONE is without excuse for specifically knowing that God exists and that they are morally accountable to Him, not just that "most people seem to have a tendency towards some kind of religious thinking." Slight difference.

I respond to Manata:

What about the mind/body problem?

What about the mind/body problem impacts this chapter? I know of no philosophical consensus coming down on the magic side of things.

How can materialism account for beliefs?

Physical computers can be constructed to have files that have direct implications for a robot's behaviors. This is analogous enough to belief.

How can materialism account for subjective experiences like pain?

That qualia is anything special is probably a systemic illusion generated by the most sophisticated computing system we know of in the universe. Magic minds wouldn't even need a brain.

What about the zombie argument?

A zombie brain that could literally perform all the sophisticated interrelated functions of the mind would have to be analogous to our minds and would probably have the same qualia "problem." If qualia doesn't do anything, why does it even "exist?"

What about The Argument from Knowledge?

Humans lack a mental function that can translate information into the necessary physical perception transaction and therefore the example is meaningless.

Does Tarico not know anything about theistic philosophy?

Is it better to be somewhat ignorant and know when you are being bamboozled by sophistry, or is it better to act like a jerk and be flagrantly wrong like Manata?

Outro: 5 out of 5 stars.

Awesome chapter. Well written.

---

Chapter 3: "The Malleability of the Human Mind," by Jason Long:

Long's rhetoric is too high strung: Are only believers biased?

I spend quite a bit of time pointing out how overblown a lot of Long's rhetoric is and what the consequences will likely be for the average Christian reader who may be looking for something to react to.

Christian reactions: I know you are, but what am I?

I survey the mostly justified Christian blowback created from the high strung rhetoric of Long's chapter.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Steve Hays:

Are atheist and Christian biases created equal?

As with the last two chapters on culture and cognitive science, intimate awareness of ubiquitous human bias has to cut deepest against the less than conservative claims of religion.

Is Calvinism affected by social conditioning?

No, but Calvinism isn't affected by concern for humanity either even though we are supposed to consider the Christian god to be a competent and loving caretaker.

Can you be afraid of hell if you don't think it exists?

No, but you can be afraid of the unknown.

Do Christians indoctrinate their children more than atheist parents?

Tough to say, but atheists aren't betraying a personal relationship with Jesus when they choose to teach their kids to think for themselves.

Are the majority of experts in the history of the ancient Near East sympathetic to Christianity?

Hays suggests otherwise, and I wouldn't know. Some help, please?

What do Long's assertions tell us about the intellectual standards of atheism?

Not a lot about atheism, but definitely something about Long and Hays.

Does Christianity have an unfair cultural mystique?

Hays brings up the obvious other competing mystiques in our cultural melting pot, but ultimately fails to make a difference to Long's point.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Jason Engwer:

Does TCD aim too low?

Yes and no, but the "low part" isn't completely unjustified if you are trying to appeal to a broader audience.

Does Long get hell wrong?

Not in any important way.

Is there no social pressure from society against Christianity?

There's certainly some, but most of what Engwer cites is the rebound from Christian influence in culture.

Are all of the conversions to Christianity by means of a persuasive historical case for the resurrection of Jesus illegitimate?

Obviously not, but people can be honestly convinced of a lot of untrue things and Christianity doesn't seem to be predominately supporting itself through the "legitimate" means.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Paul Manata:

Doesn't Long need to define rationality?

Only if Christians have burned all the dictionaries again.

Is science dead?

Even with human bias in the scientific world that promotes rigorous standards (and occasionally fails to uphold them), is religion equally objective with it (and should we overlook its anti-objectivity faith standards)?

Is x more credible than y?

When you find out what x and y actually are, Manata doesn't sound quite as correct. Surprise, surprise.

Is Long a presuppositional skeptic?

Only if one ignores Long's modern experience of a magic-less world.

Can science and religion get along?

Can the majority of religious scientists come to some supernatural conclusion already?

On Christian apologist, William Lane Craig: Can the infamous "Holy Spirit defeater defeater" be defeated after all?

Despite Long's traditional portrayal, I argue that Craig has listened to his critics and changed his tune: Craig specifically tells atheists how we might try to defeat the inner witness of the Holy Spirit.

Credentials: Is Long qualified to write this chapter?

Short answer: Despite the online tug-o-war, I don't see why not. He's reporting the science of others competently enough. Anyone is free to show otherwise.

Standards: How might we avoid conventional Christian objections in the future?

I lay out some common sense guidelines for avoiding political bs in the future and demonstrate why atheist writers should listen.

Random:

Random question (for my information): Aren't Scientologists less trusted than atheists?

Inquiring Infidel actually corrects me on how to understand the discrepancy.

I make a request: Are there studies that show which parts of the brain Christians use to deal with issues in the Bible?

Long gives the example of how people use the emotional part of their brain to reconcile the statements of political figures they agree with. I just wonder if there is something that specifically targets Christians.

Long "goes there":

Can't we just let talking donkeys lie?

Long brings up the Bible's talking donkey three times. He almost gets away with it, but not quite.

Have Bible scholars never considered alternative viewpoints?

This just opens up the Pandora's box of every "former atheist" turned educated Bible believer.

Doesn't arrogance also correlate well with IQ?

Long promotes the studies that seem to show that IQ correlates well with atheism (assuming those studies are being interpreted properly), but seems to not recognize how this fits right into how Christians profile atheists.

Outro: 3 out of 5 stars.

I thought I would give Long 4 stars initially, but was ultimately overwhelmed by how inappropriate much of his rhetoric is.

---

Chapter 4, "The Outsider Test for Faith Revisited" by John Loftus:

Loftus revisits David Eller's chapter 1 and Jason Long's chapter 3: For Better and Worse?

Loftus seems to manage to retroactively save Long's chapter, and eventually says all the things Eller should have said in his chapter, but still quotes more Eller uncritically.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Looney: Do we have to evaluate all possible worldviews before becoming an atheist?

The short answer is no. One does not have to evaluate all possible worldviews in order to have a convincing case for a particular worldview.

Loftus overstates a claim: Are all religions exclusivistic?

Since a great many religions are not mutually exclusive (even in method), Loftus' OTF is left a bit fuzzier than he presents it.

I respond to Christian reviewer, jayman777: What about religious people who convert for thoughtful reasons?

I tediously show how Loftus creates unnecessary problems for himself by lingering on this issue rather than directing readers to an actual intellectual battleground. This creates the appearance of a "no-true-rationalist" fallacy.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Paul Manata: Is Loftus' application of the OTF to Christianity incoherent?

Short answer: No. Manata pulls two Loftus quotes out of context.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Steve Hays: Is the OTF unfair because of Loftus' mission in life?

Appeal to motives doesn't invalidate a fair standard.

Loftus overstates a claim: Are Christians and atheists too delusional to get it right?

Human psychology seems to be portrayed as completely helpless and it's no surprise that Christians get the idea that they are supposed to "snap out of it" because we hypocritically said so.

Loftus is too simplistic:

Are Christians really methodological naturalists when it comes to other religions?

I imagine most Christian intellectuals who will read this book will likely not be so strictly confined. And even if they are, long standing apologetic alternative supernatural explanations are not hard for them to find.

I respond to Hays: Do many Muslims claim that demons inspired Christianity just like many Christians claim demons inspired Islam?

Hays bizarrely tries to deny it with a few variations of hairsplitting, but fails.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Jason Engwer: How does the OTF apply to appeals to modern paranormal phenomena?

If mainstream science or scholarship was against the position of your opponents, typically you'd dismiss them outright.

I respond to Hays:

Isn't methodological naturalism presumptive?

Hays wants to portray it as covert atheism even though it is the most responsible open ended research program possible even if some version of supernaturalism happens to be true.

Do atheists get to dictate common ground?

If Hays really wants to put Hiter 'staches on atheists for saying that gods, angels, devils, and magic aren't common ground, more power to him (to the demise of his credibility, that is).

Are all rare things supernatural?

Um...no...but supernatural things have to be admitted by all to at least be rare.

In the Christian worldview, doesn't the materialistic world only work because God makes it work?

The materialistic world is our common ground and explaining why it is the way it is is a debate to be had.

Can distant third-parties rule out the miraculous?

Should distant third-parties who believe in the miraculous on this absentee basis?

How can atheists appeal to probability without solving the problem of induction?

Perhaps when Christians solve the problem of induction that will be a fair question.

What about the psychological probability about whether every Christian who claims to have seen a miracle is delusional?

Without consistency of standards (a la OTF), every cloud of anecdotal hearsay would generate an ontological artifact from Bigfoot to UFOs.

Is the most responsible way to investigate miracles to just wait around and see if they happen?

Have they happened yet? Have they happened yet? Have they happened yet? No. Hmmm...miracles seem rare [begin conversation over again]

How can methodological naturalism have precedence over supernaturalism when there are also many competing naturalistic worldviews?

The materialistic world is literally our backyard, the differences between views on them is not so great, and all naturalistic worldviews would be falsified with the vindication of just one supernatural claim.

Shouldn't the best explanation in any case have precedence?

When ambiguity and probability are not relevant factors Hays point here would matter. Obviously if we have good evidence, then we have good evidence.

Did Hays and Engwer call Loftus demon-possessed?

No, but Loftus' inference was not completely unjustified since Hays is known for making those kinds of accusations.

Is all Christian anecdotal evidence of the miraculous so easily invalidated?

Loftus blows off a huge issue in 9 words without explaining exactly how Christians are supposed to deal with the issue.

I respond to jayman777:

Should moral and political beliefs be based on the scientific method?

To an extent, when required.

Would atheists doubt evolution if the demographics of science were like religion?

I would hope so.

Does the Western belief in "external reality" pass the outsider test for belief?

Yes, but not quite Loftus' version of it. See Richard Carrier's response instead.

I respond to Christian reviewer, Randal Rauser:

Would an OTB on perceptual fallacies mean we should treat all of our perception as probably false?

Yes. Fortunately, OTBs can be passed.

Should we apply the OTB to politics and ethics?

Yes. Next stupid question.

If we applied an OTB to politics would we all have to be anarchists?

No, it just means we can't treat our inherited political system as necessarily the gospel truth.

Should people explore other political viewpoints?

Yes. Next stupid question.

Should people build entire worldviews based on consistent standards of evidence?

Yes. Next stupid question.

Is the OTF unfair to Christians while letting atheists off the hook?

No, because the default setting is agnosticism and guess what, epistemology is hard.

Is the OTF the one stop fix for critical thinking?

No and Loftus never said it was.

Aren't some of the claims of metaphysical naturalism extraordinary in nature, too?

Yes, and that's what science is for (to rigorously pass difficult OTBs).

Is Loftus inconsistent when he says that atheists can't take an outsider test because there are too many other perspectives out there?

Not really, since it doesn't take much to become an agnostic insider.

How much should geographical distribution matter to apply the OTF?

Responsible people subject all their most important beliefs to scrutiny so it doesn't really matter what the exact thresholds are.

I respond to Hays:

Why is Steve Hays so dense?

Using various quotes from Hays, I demonstrate some of the reasons why this is such a difficult conversation to have with him.

Did Loftus never consider an OTB?

Hays bizarrely pretends like this issue wasn't already explained in Loftus' chapter.

Should we consider Loftus even-handed?

Turns out, Hays just didn't believe Loftus applies OTBs in practice.

Is Ben's unquestionable axiom methodological atheism?

Rather than impress us with his smashing sense of fairness, Hays merely makes accusations he can't back up.

Isn't pointing out inconsistencies in your opponent's position a basic element of refutation?

Sure, but in this case, if Loftus is personally inconsistent that doesn't tell anyone else whether they should be or not, so it's just an irrelevant personal attack.

Is James McGrath a faithless axe-grinder?

Hays appears to be offended by McGrath's use of the Golden Rule in terms of being fair with competing religious claims.

Is there no way to be more neutral than someone else?

Hays demonizes agnosticism as though every possible position is equally biased just because it can be called a position.

Are Hays' beliefs exempt from the OTF if he doesn't advocate the standard himself?

I can't seem to find anywhere in the laws of logic where it says it's okay for only Steve Hays to assert his conclusion.

Are there no outsiders to the fundamental truths of Christianity?

Hays' real problem with the OTF is that he thinks we all already know he is right.

Is the position of agnosticism cheating if there is all that evidence for God?

If there is so much evidence for God, then there's no reason that evidence cannot be presented to pass the OTF for those of us who are "confused."

Should Hays even be trying to connect with his audience?

One wonders what the point is if not.

Are Hays' theistic intuitions and inferences from natural revelation exempt from critical scrutiny?

Hays can't just assume we all have the same intuitions and so if the arguments from natural theology actually work, they can be presented to pass the OTF.

Is it hypocrisy for Hays to make sweeping statements about every nonbeliever, but object when nonbelievers do that about believers?

Yes, especially when he can't prove that he is in a position to know better and can easily be shown to ignore immediate contrary evidence to fit his ideological prejudice.

Can atheists charge Christians with hypocrisy?

Even if atheism has no moral basis, that doesn't mean Christians can be hypocritical on their own terms.

How can Ben say that he knows that all Christians inherited their faith?

I'm defending the premise of the OTF that says the vast majority of them probably did and that any further unseen mechanisms (like the Holy Spirit) would have to be justified with arguments that have more prima facie weight than the assumption of enculturalization.

Do proponents of the OTF have Hays' best interests at heart?

I don't think consistent rational thinking is going to kill Hays and plenty of people survive the journey to nonbelief.

Does everyone have to rigorously justify their worldview to have justified beliefs?

No, but if you are going to make claims well beyond the realm of human expertise (or include a lot of "I'm not that sures"), then you have to have your worldview justifications sorted out.

Does God jump start everyone with clear knowledge of his existence?

The Bible says that demons know God exists and shudder, but can all humans be expected to do the same kind of confidence-based shuddering?

How does Ben know he's not a brain-in-a-vat?

Hays avoids taking responsibility for his claim that he knows the mental states of nonbelievers with this philosophical red herring that has been addressed elsewhere.

Is it okay for Hays to make statements about the mental states of unbelievers since he has Divine Revelation on his side?

Am I allowed to say I have a crystal ball that tells me Christianity is false (and that Hays knows it) without actually proving it?

Has Hays proved that he has access to genuine Divine Revelation on his blog somewhere?

If Hays has such arguments on his blog, then he should be able to present them to pass the OTF.

Are nonbelievers who claim that they don't know that God exists just like criminals who deny their guilt?

Since Hays presents no evidence to pass the OTF, he can't quite justify calling us criminals, now can he?

Does universal revelation imply universal belief?

Hays said we all know it's true, so yes.

Don't people live in denial all the time?

People live in a lot of different kinds of mental states all the time and the evidence from nonbelievers (and everyone else) reflects this spectrum.

If Loftus can say that all Christians are delusional why can't Hays say that all nonbelievers are living in denial of the truths of theism?

Hays doesn't think he has to present any evidence to show this, whereas Loftus does (in addition to probably allowing for people being honestly mistaken, whereas there's no such thing for Hays on nonbelievers).

Don't unbelievers act just like the Bible predicts?

Some do, but not all of them.

Why would moral relativists like Loftus, Eller, and Avalos spend so much time trying to convince others to believe and behave like they do?

Even when atheists aren't moral relativists, Hays just has an excuse for that as well.

Aren't moral relativists who act inconsistently trying to evade an unwelcome truth?

Having a somewhat inconsistent moral paradigm is normal for pretty much everyone and hardly evidence they know Hays' god exists.

Doesn't our fallen human nature explain why believers can be found to struggle with the existence of God?

Wouldn't that give humanity an excuse for not knowing that God exists since our mental faculties are corrupted beyond our control?

Is the lack of denial of the existence of physical objects a bad example to compare to the denial of the existence of God?

It can't be a bad example since the existence of God is supposed to be clear and we are supposed to be without excuse.

Wouldn't a better example be the existence of the past?

To even have a conversation everyone recognizes the necessary trust we put in belief in the past and theists can only hope to argue like that for God's utility in much more ambiguous philosophical territory.

Don't unbelievers often act crazy?

Not proportionately more so than believers, as far as I know.

What's the difference between natural theology and natural revelation?

Hays says he's appealing to revelation, but that's an interpretation based on whether or not the arguments from natural theology actually work.

Can't there be subliminal inferences from natural revelation that are more primary than the arguments from natural theology?

How are we supposed to know what the correct subliminal inferences are when they differ unless the arguments from natural theology actually work?

Does Hays not have to explain how he knows that all nonbelievers are living in denial, because the OTF is a cookie-cutter standard?

The OTF is open to any Christian who doesn't fit the "mold" to pass it, and Hays still has to explain how he knows the divine revelation he appeals to is genuine.

Do Christians not need formal arguments to justify their Christian beliefs?

Christian beliefs are not conservative claims about reality (that are well outside the realm of human expertise) and many people have different kinds of innate intuitions and subliminal mental processes contrary to Christian doctrine.

Since TID is only meant to be apologetic defense, does Hays need to unpack any of the evidence for belief in divine revelation since it is secondary anyway?

Hays is just arguing for his right to not justify why Christians believe since he believes his actual arguments are secondary.

Why doesn't Ben just read the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology if he's so interested in the arguments from natural theology?

I am already reading that book, but that doesn't mean those arguments are convincing.

Can't natural revelation entail inferential knowledge and/or innate knowledge?

Either way makes no difference to the overall criticism.

Politics: Isn't the OTF just a juvenile dare to take an unfair test?

There's nothing juvenile or unfair about epistemic responsibility.

Didn't Ben misrepresent Hays' argument against atheistic epistemic duties?

Hays doesn't understand that he is appealing to motivations to care about the truth and erroneously assumes such motivations have to be absolute to be sufficient (or principled) motivations.

How can atheists shame or praise a person's relationship to their epistemic duties?

Since Christians supposedly share the value of truth, any Christian who fails to live up to that standard intentionally should be considered shameful regardless of whether shame is justified outside of that context.

Is it Ben's fault that the discussion is personal?

No one is twisting Hays' arm to take the OTF, but if someone wants to know my opinion on how shameful it is to neglect your epistemic duties, my answer is available.

What kind of argument would it take to properly address the OTF?

Instead of Hays' misapprehension of the framing of Loftus' argument, I suggest the basic template response I think that a responsible Christian ought to take.

Aren't Christians being justified in what they believe and convincing nonbelievers to become believers separate issues?

Not really, since the reasons that you present to yourself to believe should be pretty much the same ones you present to someone else.

Does Hays legitimize religious experience in general?

He says he doesn't, but then doesn't tell us how to tell Christian religious experiences from other brands of religious experiences.

Do prophetic dreams have to be religious?

No, and I never said otherwise.

Is the argument from religious experience sufficient to justify belief in God or is it inconclusive?

I compare Hays' position to Kai-man Kwan's from the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.

Is there anything wrong with looking for confirmation of a subjective experience?

No, but the perils of confirmation bias need to be taken seriously.

Dreams: Do we have to be able to justify subjective experiences like dreams that no one else can verify?

Verification from categorically analogous subjective experiences will do.

Isn't it easy to confirm that a dream is prophetic?

Dumb luck needs to be distinguished from actual prophetic accuracy.

Aren't some things too coincidental to be merely coincidental?

Possibly, but keep in mind that humans are horrible statistics machines.

Isn't rigorous correspondence arbitrary?

There are different ways to verify that dreams are prophetic and rigorous correspondence over time is one of them if the dreams in and of themselves are somewhat vague.

Couldn't a dream about the future be allegorical?

There could be many types of prophetic dreams, but the more abstract, the more difficult it will be to sort fact from fictional correspondence.

What about Joseph's dream about the 7 year famine in Egypt?

That story is hearsay and irrelevant to the conversation.

Isn't it solipsistic to be distrusting of your experiences?

Shouldn't we trust the experiences that show how fallible and unreliable our minds can be?

Isn't an argument from experience meant to only be convincing to the person having it?

Formerly religious people have had what seem to be analogous religious experiences that they didn't believe they could justify as genuine.

Don't apologists also turn to public lines of evidence?

Then why not present that evidence to pass the OTF?

Doesn't it cut equally against atheism if the brain is capable of generating all sorts of anomalous experiences?

No, because atheists aren't appealing to explicitly atheist experiences.

Doesn't God have to come to us through subjective experiences since there is no other way for us to exist?

Hays misses the point and pretends like there are no distinctions to be made along a spectrum of more subjective than not.

Doesn't raw experience not interpret itself?

The brain has many filters to process the experiences and yet not all conscious methodologies are created equal.

Doesn't the Bible have an explanation for religious confusion?

Having an explanation isn't the same thing as having the best explanation.

Doesn't Ben assume that divine communication was meant to foster unanimity of belief?

No, I argue that respecting free will can't be more morally important than respecting the need for solid information to make those choices.

Superstition and Barbarism: Is there no such thing as a superstitious person?

Hays gets offended when Loftus calls the people in Biblical times superstitious as though it doesn't point out genuine methodological distinctions in thought patterns between even modern Christians and the cultures of ancient Bible times.

What would Hays call barbaric anyway?

Just being defensive and offended doesn't make the issue go away since again, there are genuine behavioral distinctions between the social norms of the ancients and even modern Christians.

Does Loftus make no effort to apply his tests consistently to the category of superstition and barbarism?

Real differences remain between Biblically endorsed superstition and barbarism and modern Christian standards.

Can't the Bible merely record superstition that it doesn't necessarily embrace?

Sure, but what about the apparent superstition and barbarism that it does embrace?

Does a Christian have to take responsibility for Scripture since they didn't write it?

Christians have to take responsibility for their acceptance of Scripture.

Hasn't Hays, in his blog, already responded head on to charges of superstition and barbarism in the Bible?

Hays may well have done so on his blog in the past or even on Avalos chapter later in TCD, but that only reinforces that Loftus' challenge is a genuine issue.

Can moral relativists make charges of barbarism?

They can make internal criticisms to show the inconsistency and they can also make claims based on their frame of reference that Christians may happen to share.

Doesn't Hays address Carrier's moral realism later in TID?

I will take up the conversation later in my review series then.

Are atheistic moral realists inconsistent and haven't even plenty of secular writers convincingly refuted that position?

Hays needs to show that there is an inconsistency and that the arguments from those other atheists actually work.

Hasn't Hays already dealt with the issue of the internal critique of a moral relativist?

I will take up the conversation later in my review series then.

Holy Spirits: Do Mormons have a genuine self-authenticating inner spiritual witness to their faith?

Hays tries to defend Plantinga's idea of properly basic religious beliefs, but basically avoids the main issue with technicalities which Christians ignore in practice.

Mormons don't enjoy prima facie justification for their faith, right?

Hays never explains why he thinks this is the case.

Aren't there lots of unseen things we give credit to?

We give human minds, the past, possible worlds, numbers, and morals more credit because they are much more universally defensible in one way or another than a particular kind of god.

Should we automatically discount the appeal to tacit knowledge or self-authenticating mental states?

No, I pointed out when we need to raise the standards accordingly since mutually exclusive propositions are getting in via similar means.

Is it okay to claim a self-authenticating witness of the Holy Spirit as long as it's true?

Hays isn't very helpful since he doesn't bother showing us how anyone would know their self-validating religious feelings beat other people's contrary self-validating feelings in a world where none of them have to correspond to any supernatural reality.

Does Loftus fail to draw an elementary distinction between true and false claims about one’s experience?

It should have been obvious from context that Loftus is generally on the same page as me.

Do most religionists even claim to have a distinctive religious experience?

Probably not, but the vagueness hardly helps the case for the supposed reality behind the experience.

Aren't professional religious philosophers much more responsible with their claims about religious experiences?

They certainly can be, but the particular philosopher from the Blackwell Companion that Hays referenced does not make as strong of claims as he does.

Doesn't much of Islam not appeal to religious experiences at all?

This is irrelevant since there is a multitude of religious people who do and this is the brand of justification that we are talking about.

Do all religious people need their subjective religious justifications to remain untested?

Hays overtly argues Christians shouldn't have to challenge their basic justifications.

Isn't it responding to TCD on its own terms to show that a subjective religious experience can be a perfectly valid reason to believe something?

No, because Christians won't believe every similar justification and they need to apply their standards consistently.

What does it mean to “take responsibility” for something that’s not common ground?

It's called debate, Steve.

Scoring the Outsider Test: Does Hays object to the OTF because he knows his faith can't pass it?

Hays claims that the OTF is lopsided and that it presupposes Christians don't already know Christianity is true.

Did Loftus smuggle atheism into the OTF?

Only because Hays can't part with the idea of Jesus in even hypothetical terms.

Should Christians be critical of the inner witness of the Holy Spirit?

Hays confirms that he is uncritical with the inner witness of the Holy Spirit since he calls it a given.

Is the inner witness of the Holy Spirit just a matter of interpretation?

Of course the debate is about what the experience means, not whether there has been an experience or not.

Isn't there no such thing as a self-authenticating delusion?

Skeptics are pointing out that self-authenticating experiences of God aren't so self-authenticating after all or that whatever is supposed to be self-authenticating about it doesn't likely have anything to do with correspondence to a real God.

Isn't pain a self-authenticating experience?

Yes, one that is all in your head, just like God.

Would we not apply Loftus' standards in any other field of inquiry?

Just how does Hays think science gets done anyway? By asserting your conclusion and not having to prove anything?

Does Loftus prejudge believing in the Christian faith as "gullible?"

No, it's explained why in the premises of the OTF.

Is it even feasible to be skeptical about everything?

Therefore let's not be skeptical about Christianity, okay?

Does Loftus need to justify all of his beliefs via the OTB before he applies the OTF to Christianity?

Only if we pretend like there's no possible common ground to work with.

Doesn't Loftus need to justify epistemic duties with an OTB?

Hays believes that atheism undermines a genuine interest in truth.

If life just ends, doesn't that affect one's capacity to enjoy it in the meantime?

It might for some people, but not for others.

Are Christians proverbial cry-babies if they can't accept a mortal life without an afterlife clause?

It is understandable to be disappointed from a particular frame of reference you are used to, but unacceptable to fail to recognize that other people can flourish under purely naturalistic assumptions.

What if you know that after your amazing vacation you will be kidnapped and tortured?

With this analogy Hays bizarrely confuses what happens in an atheist's worldview with what happens in his Biblical Christian worldview.

Does the Bible tell us what the percentages of heaven and hell are?

Hays says no, but the Bible says few will be saved.

Even so, wouldn't the threat of hell on yourself be enough motivation to ignore the rest of the damned?

If we are just picking appealing worldviews, one would not choose this divine extortion and predominantly unhappy never-ending.

How can you avoid hell by becoming an atheist?

Hays fails to understand the "choose your favorite scenario" aspect of the conversation and presumes Christianity is still true.

But as an atheist isn't there no obligation to deny that God exists?

A hypothetical grounding isn't a grounding without proof of existence and Hays acts like there some obligation to scorn the truth no matter how indispensable a lifelong utility truth is.

Doesn't Robert Adams provide concrete examples of grounding epistemic duties in his two monographs on the subject?

It appears he grounds morality in the concept of appraised excellence, but he doesn't seem to prove God exists or tell us why the concept of excellence cannot be appreciated in its own right on naturalistic terms.

Do atheists have principled motivation to tend to epistemic duties?

Hays appears to want to say any motivation that is not absolute is unprincipled, but he does not bother defending that unjustified assumption.

Isn't a meaningless life a recipe for gratuitous suffering?

Hays invents necessary suffering for all the nonbelievers he's never met.

Don't atheists just distract themselves from this misery and live a lie?

Yes, Steve, it's a conspiracy of wanton happiness.

Aren't the rules of an atheist's life artificial?

If Christianity is false, then surely living a fake Christian life would deserve the title "artificial."

Is Ben's contribution to this cultural conversation foolish?

Maybe, but it can't be more foolish than Hays' responses.

Does Loftus need to show us in detail how each and every person on earth came to their religious conclusions?

No, probabilities will do, and it doesn't matter since if Loftus is mistaken, presenting the reasons that these religious people have for their beliefs by definition passes the OTF.

Is it a very biased assumption to treat every religious text as probably false?

We should treat religious texts with the same standards based on their actual implicit merits.

Don't cultural influences, psychological gimmicks, cognitive biases, and double standards cut equally against atheism?

In context, Hays is the one defending his right not to be sufficiently critical, as well as advocating a degree of certainty in terms of metaphysics well beyond any human's expertise.

Can anyone rise above biases or are all appeals doomed to superficiality?

Hays defaults to incredulity and misrepresentation in order to say that atheists like me believe all critical thinking is necessarily social conditioning that can't be corrected or improved upon.

Does Ben fault TID for succeeding?!

It is obvious that I freely fault and praise TCD and TID where each succeed and/or fail, if only Hays wasn't so intent on ignoring evidence contrary to his convenient narratives of the discussion.

Does Loftus misrepresent Hays by claiming that Hays admitted he only has assumptions and not good reasons?

Technically yes, but practically no. Hays assumes his theistic tacit knowledge is genuine without argument and so Loftus is vindicated in the end.

Does Hays owe Loftus a spiritual autobiography?

Explaining why one has good reasons to declare things about the mental states of an entire people group wouldn't be a bad idea.

Does TCD declare that Christians are psychotic?

No, Loftus specifically goes out of his way to say the opposite.

If Hays has been defending the Christian faith online since 2004 where has Ben been?

Being an intellectually honest agnostic and atheist blogger since 2005. :)

Does TCD fail to define delusion?

Nope, Hays just missed it.

If Christianity is culturally conditioned how can it fit the standard definition of delusional that states delusion is counter-cultural?

Unless Hays wants to say that non-believing countries aren't delusional, he's going to have to accept a slight tweak to the definition as well.

Is there no prima facie presumption that Hays' Christian faith flies in the face of the evidence since he has subjected the TCD to sustained replies?

Technically that would make Hays even more delusional than your average Christian (if Christianity is false) since he is literally flying in the face of a great deal of the evidence and argument against his position.

Should Hays have taken it to the next level in his review of TCD?

Hays' version of attacking it on its own terms was grossly superficial and even the further replies here lack any indication that substance will follow.

Is TID at the same level as TCD?

I have to say that if TCD aimed low (which wasn't consistently the case), TID aimed even lower and didn't help the case for Christians not being delusional.

Are apostates too biased because they are just trying to justify themselves?

They can be I'm sure, but attacking them doesn't help Hays here or prove that there aren't Christians who are pathetically trying to hold on intellectually to wish fulfillment.

More politics: Does it make sense to trivialize intellectual difficulties of Christianity when presented by an atheist even if apologetics is dedicated to helping Christians with many of those same difficulties?

Hays seems to think that the difference between defensive and offensive apologetic strategies he says he employs entitles him to conveniently misrepresent the truth.

Didn't Hays, Manata, and Victor Reppert "execute" the OTF in six different ways?

I don't know what Hays is referring to since they have zero kills by my count (whereas I have hundreds here). :)

Isn't it a hollowing bullying appeal to intellectual integrity unless an atheist can justify moral realism?

Hays seems to erroneously think that his disagreement with me over naturalistic moral realism has some impact on my motives.

Does Steve need Ben to affirm him?

I don't recall saying he did.

Is Ben over-focused on the OTF?

I'm only as focused on Hay' criticisms of the OTF as much as Hays is, since I'm covering all the chapters of TCD as well.

Should Hays let Loftus off the hook because of the more sensible things Ben advocates?

Hays doesn't explain why he seems to think every atheist has to pay for Loftus' exaggerations or why we can't both elevate the collective conversation despite historical sins on both sides.

Sh'ld yee shaw yir teeth unless ye can bite?

o_0

I respond to Engwer:

Does God have to convince people into belief objectively?

If God wants a confused world where it's impossible to conclude the Christian worldview is true in a responsible way, then no.

Do skeptical impressions have to always trump positive impressions of Christianity?

No, but often when addressed together impartially, there isn't much room for a positive belief in the Christian worldview.

Does Loftus go too far with this OTF?

Engwer notes there is some truth to what Loftus is advocating here, but that some aspects are unhealthy overkill. I basically agree.

I respond to Manata:

Does Loftus need to pass 20,000 more OTFs to be consistent?

Not if the overlap of the Christianities dies one death.

Is the OTF a logical truth or a theorem?

It's a probabilistic rule of thumb designed to simply illustrate a typical religious person's inability to be consistent with their standards of evidence and avoid special pleading they'd never accept anywhere else.

How does Loftus get a "highly likely" from a "very likely?"

Manata corrects the equivalent of a typo! Yay!

If all religions are probably false, then why bother even taking the OTF?

If you'd like to believe the one you've inherited is honestly true despite the odds, then evaluating it impartially makes perfect sense.

Can't Christianity still be true despite the initial low probability against it?

Yes, just like every other worldview might be true.

Does Loftus' OTF commit the genetic fallacy still?

Manata seems to be under the impression we are likely to learn new math skills from taking drugs.

Doesn't the Bible say we're supposed to know Christianity is true by the Holy Spirit?

Do you listen to con artists and apply the investment justifications suggested by infomercials?

Isn't the OTF beside the point if you can just present good reasons why Christianity is false?

Presenting reasons Christianity is false is an extension of using consistent standards of evidence and often times mere consistency of standards is what entails that Christianity is false.

Isn't the OTF too vague?

Only if words don't mean things.

Who would take an "outsider test for philosophy" if it had the same structure as the OTF and what standards would we apply?

I would hope so! And whatever standards we'd apply, hopefully they'd be consistent.

Is Loftus' OTF conclusion related to his OTF premises?

If being probably correct about your worldview is your goal, then yes.

Does Loftus disagree with Tarico on whether humans are rational?

Yes, if the Bible contradicts itself when it gives conflicting advice about answering a fool according to his folly. [In other words, no.]

Aren't a large majority of our culturally inherited beliefs also perfectly rational?

The ones we can verify independently certainly are.

Does the OTF get rid of original thinkers?

Yes, just like health care reform means the government is going to kill grandma.

Are some religions more probable than others?

If only we were allowed to have an opinion on that.

Should we treat beliefs that have a low probability of being true as probably false?

By definition, yes.

Is Manata defending his right to be inconsistent with his standards?

It sure does seem like it.

Would Manata be in a state of cognitive paralysis if he took the OTF?

Most definitely. :) But a more reasonable person wouldn't.

Would Loftus take a test to see if his cognitive faculties are reliable?

If he could, he would, but that doesn't give religion a pass.

Does Loftus prove that Manata holds double standards?

Loftus' chapter was mostly about setting the standard, not applying it, or addressing every nuance of Manata's personal convictions.

Is Christianity the only reason we can know anything (as C. S. Lewis said)?

Lewis' unverifiable perspective appears to deny the experience of others.

What happens to the OTF when people vastly agree about things at the expense of atheism?

The reverse of the OTF is not blind acceptance of popular beliefs, especially when those beliefs are beyond the realm of human expertise.

Should we evaluate our moral values as outsiders, should Loftus test the "kill babies for fun" moral theory, and are moral relativists in denial of substantial moral common ground across cultural barriers?

Manata manages to address his own materialistic anxieties if only he'd read himself in context of his other related statements.

Does Loftus' OTF fail at every level?

Nope. Manata's rebuttal does though.

I respond to Manata's 1st response to Loftus:

Should Manata care that he personally inspired the OTF?

Maybe. Jesus might be mad.

Why can't Loftus see that Manata just wants to point out that the OTF is so horrible?

Perhaps because just about everything Manata has brought up is pretty trivial?

Is Loftus the equivalent of a religious zealot?

Maybe, but it doesn't invalidate the OTF.

Did Loftus reject every Christianity with his insider test for faith?

Manata didn't show that Loftus' ITF didn't invalidate important aspects of most mainstream Christianities.

Would Plantinga's extended A/C model make Loftus premise 2 false?

Not really, but Manata should be proving we have mental god detectors rather than lamely criticizing the OTF.

Is there still no connection between premise 1 and premise 2 of Loftus' OTF?

Premise 2 is pretty much contained in premise one.

Should religious beliefs be justified by other beliefs?

All beliefs are subject to the checks and balances of other beliefs.

Is a possibility a probability?

Quibbling is quibbling.

Is someone holding a winning lottery ticket rational for believing they have it despite the odds against that being true?

The OTB would apply before you know the winning numbers. Showing the winning numbers is the equivalent of passing the OTB.

Is the OTF too uninteresting to take seriously?

Oh, it's boring as hell, but then again many important things are.

I respond to Manata's 2nd response to Loftus:

Can Loftus appeal to Eller, Tarico, and Long if he has not responded to TID criticisms of those previous chapters?

No, but I did.

Does Loftus admit that some religions are more probable than others.

Yes, but I didn't.

Did Loftus tell us why all religions are equipossible?

No, but I did.

Would Manata's brain still explode if he ever dared take the OTF?

Yes. And that's exactly why we want him to take it immediately. :D

Random:

Loftus' scientism blunder?

Loftus actually advocates "weak scientism" but he is too easily quote-mine-able otherwise.

Loftus gets it wrong: Was the atheist, Carl Sagan, making an extraordinary claim when he asserts that the cosmos is all there is?

The short answer: Yes, he was. Insert agnosticism instead.

Outro: My Rating: 4 out of 5 stars

Despite the polemical missteps, the vast majority of what Loftus says works just fine.

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Outro:

That does it for Part 1 of TCD.

Ben